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In their thoughtful comment of my paper on Federalism and Individual Liberty,
Kirchga¨ssner and Schelker (2011) address a series of points which are well-taken
and would certainly merit discussion. I would like to make, however, only one
general remark addressing the thrust of the argument in their comment which
suggests that my analysis is untenable.
Their comment reshapes my discussion on liberty on the basis of the antithesis of
rights versus benefits, which I have nowhere used in my paper. Though I have not
myself juxtaposed rights with benefits, the authors arbitrarily choose this framework in
order to combat my arguments and to reach their preferred conclusion. But this is only
their first step. In their second step they proceed further and, again arbitrarily, state
that: ‘‘Nevertheless, in our everyday life we weight quite often individual liberties
against aspects of well-being, individually as well as politically. […] Thus, it is totally
acceptable to consider the problem of individual liberty in the case of federalism from
a welfarist point of view’’ (p. 2). Their whole discussion hinges upon this choice,
which distorts my argument. I have myself admitted (when listing the limitations of
my analysis in Sect. 9 of my paper) the great difficulty of trying to treat individual
liberty as an analytical variable, but at the same time I clearly stress that going the easy
way of using utility instead of liberty is not feasible (Mantzavinos 2010, p. 116).
Liberty and welfare, though related, are distinct, and the paper does not take any
stance regarding their relationship. Furthermore, it is constructed in such a way that
an assumption regarding their relationship is not necessary. In my discussion of the
first effect of federalism on individual liberty, I clearly stress that the diversity of
institutional arrangements per se enhances the alternatives open to a citizen, and so
it is the very existence of a choice set that secures his liberty. That a citizen might
then make a choice of a certain alternative with the expectation that it will best
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satisfy his desires—as I write in my paper (p. 105)—does not mean, as Kirchga¨ssner
and Schelker suggest, that I assume a welfarist point of view or that utility
considerations enjoy some kind of primacy. All that matters for securing individual
liberty is the existence of alternatives and not how these alternatives are used or the
principles according to which choices are made.
In analyzing the second effect of federalism on individual liberty my focus is on
how the plurality of authorities exerting discretionary political power affects the
decision of a citizen to exit the jurisdiction under which he lives. My analysis of exit
costs is offered only in order to illuminate the way that the diversity of institutional
rules (which will result from the exertion of political power by a plurality of
authorities) can itself hinder the liberty of the individual. To restate my point: ‘‘The
higher the exit costs for any citizen, the more difficult the decision to change
jurisdiction and thus, in effect, the less his individual liberty becomes. The
psychological costs of adaptation to a new institutional environment function as an
impediment to the individual freedom to choose the jurisdiction under which he
wants to live.’’ (p. 110f.) This quotation along with the analysis of the exit costs is not
intended as some kind of welfarist analysis. On the contrary, it suggests that the very
fact that citizens incur psychological costs because of the diversity of institutional
rules, which is due in turn to the plurality of jurisdictions in a federalist system, is
indicative of a de facto reduction of their choice set and thus of their liberty. This
effect is indirect because it is the result of a whole mechanism at work, but it is not
utility that is of concern here. The use of the conceptual apparatus of exit costs and
the like is only supposed to help illuminate this mechanism and it can be omitted if it
misleads some readers to assume a welfarist point of view. I have restated the
argument elsewhere in my paper without using the notion of exit costs, and one can
use this description if one prefers (p. 113): ‘‘This indirect line of argument concerns
the effect institutional diversity has of increasing the degree of difficulty a citizen has
to move from one jurisdiction to another. A consequence of this fact, which is an
unintended result of a federalist organization of a polity, is a decrease in individual
liberty. This effect, which is an indirect one because it is neither designed nor
planned by the constitutional designers, causes a diminution of what I have called the
Indirect Individual Liberty. It is, in a certain way, a quasi-automatic effect, caused
and enhanced by the peculiarity of human nature to adapt well to prevailing
institutional settings and thus to find it difficult to re-adapt to new ones.’’
If one sticks to the definitions of the terms and the explanation of the mechanism
provided in the paper, then my analysis remains valid. The reformulation of the
problem and the reshaping of the arguments with the help of utility considerations by
Kirchga¨ssner and Schelker serve only to distort my argument and in no way affect its
validity.
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